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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
The rise and fall of Kremlin favorites 
The power of the Russian presidency, formidable on paper, in practice often 
seems to rest on the ability to distribute wealth-creating assets to select 
individuals and groups, with the intent of "owning" their loyalty. This could have 
been a stumbling block to President Putin, as most of the more valuable assets 
had been "divvied up" in outrageously favorable circumstances to President 
Yel'tsin's pet oligarchs. As it turns out, Putin has an ace up his sleeve: He has no 
qualms about using the prosecutor's office to force the return of onetime state 
assets from private hands.  
 
It is difficult to gather sympathy for the previous beneficiaries of Yel'tsin's 
largesse. The state property auctions of the 1990s appeared ludicrously skewed 
and rigged, while coated with a veneer of democratic and market evolution. 
(Boris Berezovsky still argues that the auctions were necessary to prevent the 
return of the Communists). There was, and still is, outrage and anger at the 
authors and recipients of these property transactions. It is unseemly, 
nonetheless, that Putin's regime would so blatantly use the security organs to 
take back what had been sold, thereby abrogating the deals of the previous 
administration. All the while, a new cast of favorites is drawn closer to the 
Kremlin.  
 
The first group of private owners to come under attack were, naturally, the first to 
attack Putin. The media, cheerleaders to Putin's early ascendancy, became 
critical of his heavy-handed tactics, the brutality of the war in Chechnya, and 
most devastatingly, his handling of the Kursk submarine tragedy. Vladimir 
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Gusinsky's Media-MOST was forced into capitulation to Gazprom under the 
watchful eye of government Minister Mikhail Lesin. (See previous NIS 
OBSERVED) Boris Berezovsky and his shares in Russian Public Television 
(ORT) for months have been batted about by an annoyed Russian executive 
branch attempting to force Berezovsky to return control of his ORT stock to the 
state. His refusal has resulted, most recently, in his eviction from a "state-owned" 
dacha, for which Berezovsky paid hundreds of thousands of dollars in annual 
rent, and a re-opening of criminal investigations against him. (AGENCE FRANCE 
PRESSE, 0530 PDT, 19 Oct 00; via C-afp@clari.net ) According to analyst 
Yevgeni Volk, "The authorities don't want those two [Berezovsky and Gusinsky] 
to remain here, to play an active political role. Their interference in Russian 
politics appears dangerous for the Kremlin." (Ibid.) 
 
Again, while it is difficult to defend individuals who used proximity to the Kremlin 
for personal gain at the expense of public revenue loss, the Putin administration's 
moves smack of an attempt at re-nationalization. Media-MOST has apparently 
dropped its challenge to the Gazprom deal forced on Gusinsky and announced it 
was nearing an "amicable" settlement with the oil giant, but all reports indicate 
that a cautious Gusinsky remains outside the country, despite the agreement. 
(AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 1030 PDT, 18 Oct 00; via C-afp@clari.net ) 
 
The Russian prosecutor's office has confirmed its willingness to be party to this 
purge of former favorites. According to First Deputy Prosecutor General Yuri 
Biryukov, the prosecutor-general's office is investigating several privatization 
deals made during the Yel'tsin regime. (FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, 20 Oct 00; 
via lexis-nexis) In one highly publicized case, Norilsk Nikel, through its Vladimir 
Potanin-owned Interros group, is being pressured to pay $140 million to the state 
because of its allegedly undervalued stock sale price. 
 
The new favored Kremlin oligarchs are just emerging. Anatoli Chubais appears to 
exist in a state of limbo between the old and new. While there are many 
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instances of attempts to destabilize his current position as head of the Unified 
Energy Systems (UES), he remains in fighting form. In recent remarks to the 
Duma, Chubais claimed to have a letter from Gazprom Chief Rem Vyakhirev 
stating that there would be a significant reduction in fuel supplied to UES next 
year. Chubais commented, "...I will have to turn electricity off to a third of the 
country. Is this a joke?" (BLOOMBERG, 18 Oct 00; via Johnson's Russia List) 
 
President Putin has already stepped in to mediate this dispute, however. In a 
meeting with Chubais and Vyakhirev in Sochi, a deal was apparently reached to 
develop a plan to stabilize fuel supplies through the year 2020. (SEGODNYA, 21 
Oct 00; What the Papers Say, via lexis-nexis)  
 
Roman Abramovich, formerly identified as a close Yel'tsin "Family" member, also 
seems to retain some influence with the new president. He has been present at 
some recent public appearances by Putin. A potential newcomer to the group is 
St. Petersburg entrepreneur Vladimir Kogan. Kogan is the president of Bakirsky 
Dom Sankt-Peterburg, which is the holding company of Promstroybank. He is 
said to be friendly with several Kremlin intimates including Aleksei Kudrin, 
German Gref and Anatoli Chubais. (OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, 12 Oct 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000-1012, via World News Connection) 
 
So what have the now out-of-favor oligarchs, and even those who may be on 
shaky ground, done to counter the weight of the government's ire? Unionize, of 
course. Arkadi Volsky, head of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, 
announced that several of Russia's most prominent businessmen, likely to 
include Anatoli Chubais, Vladimir Potanin and others, will be joining the union. In 
a sign of surely changing times, Volsky commented "No more divisions into red 
directors and oligarchs." (ITAR-TASS, 1055 GMT, 6 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
1006, via World News Connection) 
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Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Luba Schwartzman 
 
Having a blast in Stavropol 
The police, special service and internal affairs officers have been kept busy with 
explosions, bomb threats, and discoveries of related materiel throughout the 
south of Russia and along railroads, as well as in Grozny. Several almost 
simultaneous explosions at the Pyatigorsk railroad station and at the 
Nevinnomyssk bus station and market (both cities are in the Stavropol region) 
killed 4, and injured over 30 persons on Sunday, 15 October; 8 persons (2 
civilians) died and another 20 were injured by a car bomb that was detonated 
near the temporary internal affairs department in Grozny three days earlier. 
Bombs have been located and defused in a hotel in the town of Budennovsk 
(Stavropol region) (ITAR-TASS, 0717 GMT, 12 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1012, 
via World News Connection), at the Gudermes railroad station in Chechnya, 
along the Western Siberian railroad near Kemerovo (ITAR-TASS, 1107 GMT, 16 
Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1016, via World News Connection), at the only active 
church in Grozny (INTERFAX, 1423 GMT, 4 Oct 00; via lexis-nexis), and on a 
street corner in Grozny, hidden under a pile of trash. (RIA, 0652 GMT, 12 Oct 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-1012, via World News Connection)  
 
In response, freight trains from Chechnya and the surrounding region are being 
inspected (ITAR-TASS, 1756 GMT, 15 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1015, via World 
News Connection), roads and public areas are patrolled by special units, 
checkpoints have been reinforced throughout Grozny, passport inspections have 
been intensified, and the public has been asked to be vigilant and to report 
suspicious persons, objects and activities. (ITAR-TASS, 0742 GMT, 18 Oct 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-1018, via World News Connection)  
 
An Obshchaya gazeta article suggests that there has been an adjustment in the 
treatment of terrorism, that "officials are not insisting on the 'Chechen' version, as 
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had been the case in similar instances before." One theory is that "the state is 
starting to change its attitude towards the Chechen problem," seeking the 
cooperation of local politicians instead of relying on a policy of complete 
destruction. (OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, 12 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1012, via 
World News Connection) While such a concept would not be unwelcome, it is 
also possible that the powers that be are toning down slightly the emphasis on 
"Chechen terrorism," realizing the danger of crying "Chechens!" early and often. 
One should also note that in a later analysis of the incidents, "the Chechen trace" 
was still considered a key version. (INTERFAX, 1040 GMT, 12 Oct 00; via lexis-
nexis)  
 
Random acts of kindness? 
The Federal Security Service's (FSB) public relations center released a press 
review on 17 October, concerning organizations in 49 Russian regions created 
by extremists of the Moslem Brotherhood, a militant, revisionist, international 
Islamic organization. According to the FSB, these groups, which camouflage 
themselves as charity organizations, are most concerned with "kindling separatist 
feelings in Moslem regions" and coordinating actions with terrorist groups of Al-
Gamaa al-Islamiya and al-Jihad al Islami, with Osama bin Laden and with 
Bosnian militants. (ITAR-TASS, 17 Oct 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
A booming industry kept in check 
The Russian interior ministry inspected about 20,000 private security firms, 
detective agencies, paramilitary guard units, sport and hunting organizations, 
storage facilities and shops selling weapons as part of the "Shield-2000" 
operation. Fifteen unlicensed schools for training guards were exposed, as well 
as 3,300 unregistered persons providing protective and detective services; 
18,000 firearms and 307 kilograms of explosives were confiscated; over 46,000 
persons were charged with "administrative responsibility"; and 1,396 others faced 
"criminal responsibility" for violation of ordinances concerning arms transactions. 
 6 
(ITAR-TASS, 1338 GMT, 18 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1018, via World News 
Connection) 
 
No closer to home 
Russian officials have continued to act indignant concerning the (fairly tame) 
pressure coming from the US in regards to Edmund Pope. Among the 
statements made is an unbelievable one by Anatoly Dolgolaptev, the head of the 
League of Russian Defense Plants: "In my opinion, this is an extremely non-
constructive attitude. Lawful business exists and it must be fully developed. It is 
very unethical to lay the blame on someone else [but at least] there will be less 
theft of our technological secrets." (INTERFAX, 1153 GMT, 5 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-
2000-1005, via World News Connection) On a more serious note, the court has 
been unwilling to allow any of Pope's requests -- a medical examination, an 
impartial translator, or at least permission to tape record the assigned interpreter 
(who has obvious FSB ties), the summoning of the main witness, Anatoly Babkin, 
etc. Mr. Pope's lawyer, Pavel Astakhanov, said that the American businessman, 
in custody since April, has been working on a 40-page statement "to assert his 
innocence and his attitude towards the progress of the trial," which he will read 
out and submit to court on Monday. (INTERFAX, 0904 GMT, 19 Oct 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000-1019, via World News Connection)  
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Sarah Miller 
 
Another setback for Russian diplomacy: the Middle East 
On the heels of its indecisive foreign policy during the Yugoslav crisis earlier this 
month, Russia has suffered yet another diplomatic setback, this time in the 
Middle East. Despite the Putin administration's emphasis on increasing Russia's 
foreign policy momentum, Russia's conspicuous absence from the emergency 
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Mideast peace summit at Sharm el-Sheikh on 16-17 October appears to be 
another instance of diplomatic mismanagement. 
 
Over the past few years, Russia has invigorated its involvement in the Middle 
East. NATO actions in Kosovo provided the Yel'tsin administration with the 
perfect pretext under which to build up its position in the region as co-sponsor of 
the Middle East "peace process." Since then, Russia has increased its 
involvement by contrasting what it has termed the West's "unipolar" influence in 
the Middle East and its own self-ascribed role as a leader of the "multipolar" 
world. (See NIS OBSERVED, 10 May 99) In addition to rebuilding its 
international diplomatic prestige, this effort allowed Russia to increase ties to 
Muslim countries and their leaders, including Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat, who 
has visited Moscow with surprising regularity since that time. Under President 
Vladimir Putin, the momentum begun by Yel'tsin has grown. Thus, it was 
unsurprising that Putin dispatched Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov to the region 
when the most recent violence broke out in the Middle East. 
 
Indicative of the premium that Russia has begun to place on its role in the Middle 
East, Ivanov met with a number of Middle East leaders during the recent crisis in 
a unilateral attempt to become a player in the region. The diplomatic flurry 
included visits to Syria, Lebanon and Israel. However, like the host of other 
envoys from across the globe also dispatched to the region, Ivanov was unable 
to facilitate any definitive agreement between the sides. But even without a 
solution, as late as 13 October -- Ivanov's departure date from the Middle East -- 
the Russian diplomatic effort was still in full swing. Prior to leaving the region, 
Ivanov painted his efforts in a positive light by noting that the "position of rejection 
is being replaced by dialogue." (REUTERS, 16 Oct 00; via RussiaToday.com) 
Similarly, throughout Ivanov's visit, Putin reiterated Russia's desire to "play a 
bigger role in the Middle East peace process." In fact, until a day prior to the 
announcement of the emergency summit, Russian diplomacy showed no signs of 
decreasing momentum. However, as quickly as the summit was announced, the 
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Russian government seemed to abandon the initiative altogether, shifting 
attention to relations with Iran. 
 
The intensity of Ivanov's diplomatic efforts and Russia's recent involvement in the 
region only compounded Russia's conspicuous absence at the Sharm el-Sheikh 
gathering. A variety of heads of state attended the summit, including Israeli Prime 
Minister Ehud Barak, Palestinian leader Yasir Arafat, US President Bill Clinton, 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, King Abdullah of Jordan, UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan and European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana. 
Although the precise reasons behind Russia's absence at the table are still 
unclear, some reports indicate that if Russia received an invitation to the 
Egyptian summit at all, it was addressed to Ivanov, not Putin, sparking a 
diplomatic tantrum in Moscow. (REUTERS, 17 Oct 00; via RussiaToday.com) A 
foreign ministry statement released on 16 October, in which the Russian 
government expressed interest in participating in the summit "at the same level 
as other participants," suggests that Putin perceived the absence of a personal 
invitation as a snub by the West. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 16 Oct 00) In this 
respect, Moscow's response that "Putin hadn't wanted to go to the summit in any 
event," and his decision to spend the summit vacationing at a Black Sea resort 
seemed like a childish ploy to de-emphasize the significance of his absence. 
 
But Putin seemed to have regained his diplomatic composure in a letter to the 
participants of the summit. Sent as violence once again flared in the region late 
last week, Putin's message said Russia would continue to play an active role in 
the search for peace. "Russia cannot remain indifferent to the fact that explosive 
potential is again building up in the Middle East," Putin said. "Now much greater 
effort and political will is required to resume the peace process," indicating that 
notwithstanding the recent setback, Russian diplomatic ambitions have not 
faded. (REUTERS, 22 Oct 00; via RussiaToday.com) Whether or not Russia can 
match action with words is another matter since even Putin has acknowledged 
Russia's lack of resources to conduct such extensive diplomatic efforts. 
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Thus, Russia's exclusion from the summit seems to be more associated with 
diplomatic mismanagement on both sides than a signal that Russia has decided 
to pull out of the region altogether. For the time being, Russia still has a role in 
the region -- given its ties to the Palestinian leadership in particular -- if it deems 
further involvement to be expedient. It seems unlikely, therefore, that Russia 
would abandon its unilateral moves so quickly, especially in light of the prestige 
associated with its role as co-sponsor. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Putin's organizational maneuvers challenged 
Vladimir Ryzhkov, a member of the Duma Committee for Federation Affairs and 
Regional Policy, has voiced support for Putin's desire to limit regional leaders to 
two terms. "Any precedent of deviation from this norm may be dangerous 
because it will cause a chain reaction." (ITAR-TASS, 1835 GMT, 4 Oct 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000-1004, via World News Connection) 
 
Partly in response to this initiative, as well as Putin's past grabs at regional 
power, a group of Russian senators is preparing to appeal to the Constitutional 
Court. Chuvash President Nikolay Fedorov and Moscow city duma chairman 
Vladimir Platonov are leading the effort and are ready as a first step to submit 
their draft motion at an upcoming session of the Constitutional Committee of the 
Federation Council.  
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In addition to their concern over Putin's desire to limit the number of terms 
regional leaders may serve, Fedorov and Platonov and their supporters are 
concerned about Putin's new power to remove heads of the regions for a set of 
rather vague justifications. Fedorov and Platonov claim that such actions would 
violate the federalist provisions of the Constitution. They argue that it is the 
prerogative of the judiciary, not the executive branch, to call regional leaders to 
account.  
 
Fedorov said the "presidential laws" on reinforcing the vertical power structure 
actually have the purpose of establishing "a powerful, autocratic and bureaucratic 
type of government based on the power ministries' structures and on the will of 
an autocrat.... This is neo-Bolshevism which will recreate all the worst features of 
Russian authoritarianism."(EKHO MOSKVY, 0528 GMT, 19 Oct 00; via lexis-
nexis) 
 
REGIONS 
Novgorod governor speaks out against Putin's policy 
Novgorod Governor Mikhail Prusak is not pleased with President Putin's federal 
districts or the way in which they have been evolving. As many had suspected, 
Putin is using these districts to extend his control over the regions. (See NIS 
OBSERVED, 13 Sep 00) 
 
Prusak points to several developments that he finds disturbing. First, most 
federal resources are being invested in the capital cities of the federal regions. 
"With today's policy all people will soon be living in the capitals of the seven 
districts, and the rest of the territories will become a wilderness." Second, 
regional banks are being pressed to combine activities across the relevant 
federal region. "Branches of the Savings Bank, for example, are being 
consolidated, we will no longer have a full-fledged oblast Savings Bank here, 
there will be a Northwest Savings Bank in Petersburg." Third, "the same thing is 
being done with telecommunications -- a northwest branch of Rostelekom is 
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being formed. And so with all services: the attorney's office, the Anti-Economic 
Crime Department.... Raking up into a pile people and resources and 
departments is the mentality of the military, the power ministers. Look how many 
generals we already have here in high civilian office! What is to be expected of 
them? They govern as they know how." 
 
When asked why the governors are going along with the president's reforms, 
Prusak noted that the governors are blinded by Putin's popularity, even though 
they are aware of his centralizing tendencies. (OBSHCHAYA GAZETA, 12 Oct 
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1012, via World News Connection) 
 
The changes in the membership of the Federation Council, the creation of the 
State Council and federal districts will allow Putin to return Soviet-type power to 
the offices of the Kremlin should he choose to do so. And this is precisely what 
many ordinary Russians favor, having suffered under Yel'tsin's weakness and the 
corresponding rapaciousness of the "oligarchs." The constitutional court seems 
to be the only institution left able to defend Russian democracy, and it is an 
imperfect one at that. It remains to be seen just how far the pending court 
challenge to Putin's centralization measures will go. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
A new territorial pact for Europe? 
This month, the full impact of the European Union's decision to forge a gas 
supply partnership with Russia became clear for Ukraine. The EU plan to double 
its gas imports from Russia within the next 20 years effectively hands Russia the 
trump power card in the region, making it more difficult not only for Ukraine, but 
also for other former Soviet republics, to resist Russian pressure on a litany of 
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issues. The biggest problem for Ukraine, of course, is the supply of Russian gas 
the country will receive in the future -- and what the country will need to 
surrender to get it.  
 
The two countries have been attempting to deal with the gas issue for several 
years now, as Ukraine's debt to the Russian gas monopoly Gazprom grows by 
hundreds of millions of dollars almost on a monthly basis. Gazprom also has 
been understandably irritated by Ukraine's illegal siphoning of gas from transit 
lines going through the country from Russia to Western Europe. This multiplying 
gas debt has allowed Russia to pressure Ukraine on any number of issues, from 
the so-called "discrimination" against Ukraine's Russian minority to turning over 
Ukrainian state assets to Russia as payment. 
 
It seemed just a month ago, however, that Ukraine was finally beginning to dig its 
way out of the gas debacle and was beginning to stand on a more equal footing 
with Russia. Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma announced that the country had 
come to an agreement with Turkmenistan regarding past gas arrears and future 
gas supplies, allowing him for the first time in years to speak about 
"diversification" of gas supply. The government, meanwhile, also proposed giving 
Russia a share in the country's pipeline transit system for 25 years, thus wiping 
out its debt to its neighbor, eliminating the need to surrender state assets 
completely, and significantly reducing Russian pressure to pursue an "eastward" 
course. This plan, which was the best that could be hoped for in a bad situation, 
was soon endorsed by the parliament under the guise of gas line "privatization." 
 
Then came the EU's announcement that it wanted to increase dramatically its 
imports of gas from Russia. The announcement seemed to imbue Russia with 
confidence, confirming its view of its position in the region. Moscow began 
aggressively pursuing a deal with a consortium of European companies to build a 
new pipeline that would bypass Ukraine, thus eliminating any possibility of future 
illegal siphoning -- and, along with it, any transit fees to be paid to Ukraine. On 19 
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October, that deal apparently came to fruition. "With Gaz de France and our 
other European partners [Italy's ENI, Germany's Wintershall and Ruhrgas], we 
have signed a document and together we are starting to construct the pipeline," 
Gazprom head Rem Vyakhirev announced. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 19 
Oct 00; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) 
 
The statement actually may have been more significant for its psychological 
factor than its actual impact, however. Gaz de France told Agence France 
Presse that the signed document only created a feasibility study, casting doubt 
on at least some of Vyakhirev's statements. 
 
Even more important than Vyakhirev's exaggeration was the utter disregard for 
Poland in the process. In a communique issued following Gazprom's 
announcement, the Polish economic ministry noted that Poland had not been 
involved in the negotiations to build a pipeline through it, and said, "talks on 
planning and building transit gas pipelines to Western Europe should be held 
with the participation of the Polish side." (PAP NEWS AGENCY, 19 Oct 00, 1549 
GMT; via lexis-nexis) Further, the statement reiterated Poland's opposition to any 
pipeline that would bypass Ukraine. "Poland continues to oppose for economic, 
ecological and political reasons the project to link the Russian and Western gas 
networks." (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 19 Oct 00; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis)  
 
Russia, however, does not seem too concerned about this minor detail. 
Moscow's Alfa Bank, in its daily market comment, noted, "We believe this 
consortium of major European gas operators combined with the political support 
of Russia and the European Union will help overcome this difficulty." (REUTERS, 
19 Oct 00; via America Online) Even some of the Polish media suggested that 
Poland will not be able to continue "to defend Ukraine." The Polish News Bulletin 
put it bluntly when it noted that "after recent declarations by EU countries that 
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want to import more gas from Russia, this stance has become difficult to keep." 
(POLISH NEWS BULLETIN, 20 Oct 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
The fact is that Gazprom's newfound camaraderie with the EU, and the 
willingness of European companies to work with Russia to the exclusion of 
smaller countries like Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan, is a powerful psychological 
tool, working for the victor and against the others. 
 
At his 16 October summit in Sochi with Kuchma, Russian President Vladimir 
Putin used that tool with expert skill. By the end of the summit, it had become 
clear that Russia would be happy to accept a large stake in Ukraine's pipeline 
system, but no, that would not settle the debt. The system needed too much 
modernization, "experts" noted, to be an answer to the debt problem. As ITAR-
TASS said on the day of the summit, "According to experts' calculations, 
Ukrainian gas pipelines need between 500 million to one billion dollars of 
investment to rebuild them," which "reduces the attractiveness of the Ukrainian 
gas distribution network." (ITAR-TASS, 0709 GMT, 17 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
1017, via World News Connection) To show his country's fraternalism, however, 
Putin graciously agreed to "allow" Turkmenistan to export gas to Ukraine through 
Russia without adding an exorbitant transit fee to the per cubic meter price of the 
gas. He also suggested that, if a pipeline were built, he would guarantee that 
Ukraine be granted the contract to supply the pipes. Russian pipe producers 
blasted this "concession" and undoubtedly will campaign vigorously against it 
should Putin ever be asked to fulfill his verbal promise.  
 
There was no question following this summit that the EU's decision to work only 
with Russia was dispiriting for other former Soviet republics. It becomes more 
difficult to resist Russian pressure when there appears to be no other alternative. 
Of course, it is well within the rights of the EU to search for new ways to stabilize 
its gas supply. It is unfortunate, however, that the organization did not use the 
opportunity to involve other countries, thus making it clear that Russia would not 
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be allowed to use its gas power as a lever. Modernization of the Ukrainian pipe 
system, for example, would reportedly increase its capacity by 30 percent. This 
should be of interest to Western Europe. Certainly, Turkmenistan's contribution to 
Western Europe could be substantial, not to mention the gas exporting potential 
of the Caspian countries. Instead, Western Europe has handed an old 
hegemonic power a hammer, and stood by as Moscow announced that it would 
bring down that hammer.  
 
BELARUS 
Professor Lukashenka? 
Many public relations practitioners in the West could learn a lot from Alyaksandr 
Lukashenka. His response to critics in the Belarusian opposition and Western 
Europe of the recent parliamentary elections has been both entertaining and 
effectively geared toward his primary market. Yes, Alex might have a big future 
once this dictator gig is up. 
 
The strategy? Just deny and restate the facts while demonizing your opponents. 
For example, when the other side, in the form of the OSCE, suggests that "the 
minimum requirements for free, fair, equal, accountable and open elections were 
not met," simply announce the opposite on the state media. While you're at it, 
convince your neighbor next door to vouch for you, allowing your market -- 
Belarusian citizens outside Minsk -- to read in the newspaper that "the absolute 
majority of independent international observers, including representatives of the 
European Union, have recognized that the election was free and honest." 
(INTERFAX, 0752 GMT, 18 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1018, via World News 
Connection)  
 
Following that, ensure everyone understands that your opponent is distorting 
facts based on a vendetta to destroy you and your glorious country. "All this 
shows that groundless and large-scale political provocation is being pursued 
against Belarus in an effort to discredit the country's leadership," Lukashenka's 
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chief of staff told reporters, while Lukashenka himself explained that the elections 
were held "in absolutely democratic fashion." (INTERFAX, 1737 GMT, 17 Oct 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-1017, via World News Connection, and REUTERS, 18 Oct 00; 
via America Online)  
 
These statements repeated continuously over several days and combined with a 
lack of media access for opponents add up to victory, Lukashenka-style. More 
importantly, they equate to the continuation of the status quo for the people of 
Belarus, heading into a winter that undoubtedly will be exceedingly difficult. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
GEORGIA 
Irrelevance is bliss: CFE and OSCE 
In most introductory-level courses on international relations theory, the same 
nagging question is raised time and again: What good are international 
organizations if they are powerless to implement their decisions? If institutions 
like the UN and the OSCE are doomed to be at the mercy of the most powerful 
member states, why create and maintain these elaborate and expensive 
structures? Such questions seem all the more prescient in connection with the 
ongoing wrangling over the removal of Russian military bases from Georgia.  
 
Nearly a year ago, at the Istanbul summit of the OSCE, Russia undertook the 
obligation to remove its four military bases from Georgia. This promise took the 
form of an Annex to the Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. (www.osce.org) Thus, Russia 
did not merely make a bilateral promise to Georgia but undertook an obligation to 
all the signatories and OSCE members. So, one would expect the OSCE to take 
the lead in negotiating the terms of Russian compliance. Instead such talks have 
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continued on a bilateral basis between Georgia and Russia. It isn't a great 
surprise, therefore, that Russia has been stalling and bullying Georgia to avoid 
implementation. The big surprise is that Georgia has hung on and not given 
ground. 
 
What price visas? 
Although Russia has threatened to impose visa requirements on Georgia many 
times over the last year, the latest round of Russian-Georgian negotiations 
coincided with a much tougher Russian position on the issue. Russia announced 
its withdrawal from the CIS visa-free travel arrangement in September and 
ominously indicated that it would negotiate separate agreements with each 
country. 
 
Azerbaijan was the first of the Caucasian states to ensure ongoing visa-free 
travel -- the announcement of which coincided with Foreign Minister Vilat Guleiv's 
October visit to Moscow. This was the first time an Azerbaijani foreign minister 
had gone to Moscow since independence. It was announced that Putin would 
visit Baku in November. Visa-free travel for Armenian citizens was finalized 
several days later. A similar arrangement was not forthcoming for the Georgians. 
 
Round four and still standing 
In the latest round of Russian-Georgian talks concerning the bases, held on 19-
20 October, the Russian side elaborated its earlier proposal of shifting the 
Gudauta base to support the Russian "peacekeepers" in Abkhazia. (According to 
the OSCE document, that base should be dismantled by 1 July 2001.) One 
member of the Georgian delegation had said that Georgia would consider the 
proposal to turn the base into a rehabilitation facility if all the military hardware 
was removed. To add fuel to the Russian fire, on 21 October the Abkhaz 
representatives claimed that any materiel to be taken from Gudauta "is supposed 
to be transferred to Abkhazia." (PRIME NEWS AGENCY, 20 Oct 00; BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) 
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Russian Deputy Prime Minister Iliah Klebanov suggested to Interfax that Russia's 
proposal to retain control of the base, to become a "rehabilitation-training center" 
for the peacekeepers, would be implemented by the parties. (INTERFAX, 19 Oct 
00; via lexis-nexis) Other media outlets carried the same misinformation. This 
prompted Georgian Foreign Minister Irakly Menagarishvili and Giorgi Baramidze, 
chairman of the Parliamentary Defense and Security Committee, to clarify in no 
uncertain terms that the Gudauta base had to be withdrawn before any 
discussion of setting up a rehabilitation center for the "peacekeepers" could 
commence. (PRIME NEWS AGENCY, 19 Oct 00; BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, and ITAR-TASS, 21 Oct 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Advances to round five 
The next round will be held in December and will take up the question not only of 
Gudauta and Vaziani but also of the timetable for the withdrawal of the bases at 
Batumi and Akhalkalaki which Russia has undertaken to remove before the end 
of 2003. According to the Russian newspaper Kommersant, Klebanov hinted that 
a Georgian refusal to let Batumi and Akhalkalaki remain would prompt Russia to 
renege on its promise to dismantle Gudauta and Vaziani. In this way Russia 
could keep all four bases. Other levers to press for Georgian compliance include 
imposing the visa regime and pushing for repayment of Georgia's debts to 
Russia. The paper commented that Georgian-Russian relations are at the 
absolute lowest point since independence, even worse than during the Abkhaz 
war. (KOMMERSANT, 19 Oct 00; Russian Press Digest, via lexis-nexis) 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Lt. Col. James DeTemple 
 
CIS collective security system: implications for Central Asia 
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Russia and its five partners in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
Collective Security Treaty (CST) -- Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan -- signed an agreement on 11 October in the Kyrgyz capital, 
Bishkek, to create regional forces and a collective security system. This latest 
effort by Russia to consolidate control within the CIS security framework has 
broad implications for Central Asia. The CST member states also adopted a joint 
statement on Central Asian security, highlighting their concern over the situation 
on the CIS's southern flank.  
 
The defense agreement is intended to improve politico-military integration and 
provide operational military capability in the form of regional forces. The security 
accord "On Creating Forces and Means of the Collective Security System" 
establishes the basis for introducing collective troops on the territories of CST 
countries. Each of the six member countries agreed to allocate national military 
units for use as CST forces. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 16 Oct 00) A 
message has already gone out to the general staffs to "draft proposals on 
forming regional forces" in support of the collective security system. (INTERFAX, 
1524 GMT, 11 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1011, via World News Connection) The 
allocated units will participate in exercises and, if necessary, military operations 
on the territories of CST states under a joint command. Potentially, this could 
serve as a pretext for sending mainly Russian troops into troubled areas. The 
CIS Collective Security Council, consisting of the heads of state, will decide 
collectively when and where to deploy troops, as well as the purpose and length 
of their deployment, along with the consent of the host country. According to the 
agreement, the "tasks of a multi-national military force would include jointly 
repelling foreign military aggression and carrying out joint counter-terrorism 
operations." (JANE'S INTELLIGENCE DIGEST, 20 Oct 00) 
 
The security pact outlines a three-tiered collective security system consisting of a 
western sector (Russia and Belarus), a South Caucasian sector (Russia and 
Armenia) and a Central Asian sector (Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and 
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Tajikistan). Russia's inclusion in all three tiers demonstrates Moscow's strategic 
intent to maintain spheres of influence in the "near abroad," and to cement 
further its role as a permanent military fixture in the CST states. In Central Asia, 
the collective security system has two large gaps due to the nonparticipation of 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, which have rejected attempts to reinstate Russian 
hegemony. (Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 16 Oct 00) The Uzbek and 
Turkish presidents recently agreed on the "need to settle regional security issues 
in coordination with the UN, the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
Europe and NATO," signifying Uzbek rejection of Moscow's latest plan for a 
"regional group of forces under its own leadership" within the CIS Collective 
Security Treaty framework, against Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. 
 
Indeed, Uzbekistan's president, Islam Karimov, has criticized Moscow for using 
the threat of Taliban expansion into countries bordering Afghanistan as 
justification for creating a Russian-led collective force, in addition to maintaining 
political and military control over Central Asia. (ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 10 Oct 
99; FBIS-NES-2000-1010, via World News Connection) By agreeing to 
subordinate national military forces to Russian command, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are surrendering a certain degree of independence, 
making them more closely resemble Russian satellites than sovereign states. 
 
Along with the agreement, the presidents of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan issued a joint statement expressing their 
concerns about international terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking, as 
well as the long-term destabilizing influence of the Afghanistan civil war on 
security in Central Asia. (INTERFAX, 1156 GMT, 11 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
1011, via World News Connection) Concern was also voiced over the export of 
Islamic extremism, particularly from Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. Additionally, 
the CST signatory countries appealed to the United Nations to convene a special 
session of the UN Security Council to settle the "Afghanistan problem." The UN 
has not taken any action so far in response to this petition from the CST states. 
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(INTERFAX, 0857 GMT, 11 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1011, via World News 
Connection) By identifying sources of instability on the southern borders of the 
CIS, the statement itself underscores the need for a collective security system. 
 
Shaping such a security system including regional forces is the first concrete step 
Russia has taken to establish the CST as a military framework, particularly in 
Central Asia. By setting up this broad coalition, Russia creates a legal basis for 
its own intervention in Central Asia, especially on the Tajik-Afghan border. 
Unquestionably Russia will use the new collective security system as a tool to 
strengthen its southern periphery and preserve its lasting military presence in the 
Central Asian states. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
The CIS comes a-callin', but no one answers the knock on the door 
Interior ministers from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania met with their Russian 
counterpart last week in central Latvia and rejected the notion of participation in 
the CIS interior council. According to a spokesman for the Latvian interior 
minister, the Baltic states plan to limit interaction with Russia to bilateral and 
quadrilateral acts. (BNS, 17 Oct 00; via lexis-nexis) One example of such 
cooperation was provided the same day, when the ministers agreed to work 
together to combat organized crime in the region. (AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, 
1017 EST, 17 Oct 00; via lexis-nexis) What's interesting is that such forays 
continue to be made to states which had made it clear on several previous 
occasions that they had no interest in joining any portion of the Commonwealth 
of Independent States.  
 
While the Balts rejected an invitation from the east, they clamor for an invitation 
from the west. The defense ministers of aspirant countries met in Sofia in mid-
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October and reaffirmed their desire to join NATO. They promised to fulfill 
obligations detailed in their countries' Membership Action Plans, including 
defense restructuring, development of defense capabilities and preparation for 
participation in NATO-led operations. Now is the time for candidate countries to 
modernize their armed forces, NATO Secretary-General George Robertson told 
the ministers. (BTA, 1545 GMT, 13 Oct 00; FBIS-EEU-2000-1013, via World 
News Connection) 
 
As the Baltic defense budgets creep toward the stated goal of 2 percent of GDP, 
substantial sums will need to be allotted to facilities maintenance and 
modernization. The quays of the Miinisadam main naval base in Tallinn, for 
instance, are collapsing gradually and cannot take heavy weight. This caused 
problems recently for a German navy transport and supply ship which carried 
equipment for the Estonian navy but could not dock at the naval base. Instead, 
the ship had to dock at the border guard base. (ETA NEWS AGENCY, 0807 
GMT, 5 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1005, via World News Connection)  
 
While the Estonian General Staff has said repair work at the naval base will 
begin in the near future, modernization plans are firmer for the former Soviet 
military airfield at Amari, near the capital. About $1.2 million have been allocated 
for the installation of security equipment and barriers; the money will be set aside 
from the defense ministry's budget for next year. In addition to serving the 
Estonian air force, the airfield is the site of the command center for the joint Baltic 
airspace surveillance system BALTNET and the national airspace monitoring 
center. (BNS, 1449 GMT, 10 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1010, via World News 
Connection) The Latvian Air Force Information Center, which will summarize 
information on Latvian airspace as part of BALTNET, also opened officially this 
month. (BNS, 1115 GMT, 13 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1013, via World News 
Connection) 
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Investment in such joint activities does seem to be the wisest move open to 
Baltic governments faced with minuscule budgets and a need to create an 
attractive candidacy for Western alliances. Given financial and time restrictions, 
and increasingly dilapidated military facilities left over from the Soviet era, no one 
assumes that the individual countries can create fighting forces on a par with 
wealthier NATO countries. However, the Baltic states do have something to offer 
if they can coordinate and maintain the joint surveillance system in the region 
and, eventually, link that to systems farther south. 
 
LITHUANIA 
A mandate for change 
Over 53 percent of registered voters participated in the 8 October parliamentary 
elections that brought a clear demand for a change in leadership, with a routing 
of the incumbent Conservative coalition. Indeed, a coalition of the Lithuanian 
Democratic Labor Party (LDLP), the Social Democratic Party, the New 
Democracy Party and the Lithuanian Union of Russians gained the most votes. 
 
Although the LDLP, led by former President Algirdas Brazauskas, obtained the 
largest number of seats, support was insufficient to obtain a majority in the 
Seimas. Instead, the New Policy Bloc, a coalition comprised of the New Union, 
the Liberal Union, the Modern Christian Democrats and the Center Union, earned 
President Valdas Adamkus' approval to form the government. The leader of the 
New Union, Arturas Paulauskas, will become Seimas chairman, while Rolandas 
Paksas, leader of the Lithuanian Liberal Union, will become prime minister once 
again. (BNS, 10 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1010, via World News Connection) 
Paksas resigned from the position a year ago, over the sale of interest in the 
country's oil industry to the US-based Williams company. 
 
The PM candidate assured the media, however, that he would not seek 
cancellation of the agreement with Williams. "I understand perfectly the meaning 
of an international agreement between a US company and Lithuania, and I can 
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see the consequences of unilateral denunciation of the pact by Lithuania," 
Paksas said. Still, he added, there is a need to make Williams adhere to the 
agreement as it was signed. "I am convinced that the Americans have so far 
failed to fulfill their obligations," he added, although he refused to elaborate on 
which obligations were unmet. (BNS, 0925 GMT, 11 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-
1011, via World News Connection) 
 
Paksas did not reserve his get-tough policy only for Williams. He seems bound to 
disappoint Russian expectations of smoother, more congenial relations. In an 
interview with the Baltic News Service, Russian Duma deputy Aleksandr Chuev 
foresaw that a transfer of power from the Conservatives to a coalition led by 
Paksas and Paulauskas would make Lithuania "more friendly towards Russia," 
and the demand for compensation from Russia for Soviet-era damage would 
become a "thing of the past." However, a spokesman for Paksas said the "new 
government will discuss the issue of compensation for the damage inflicted by 
the Soviet occupation without delay, as any other urgent issue." (BNS, 1602 
GMT, 11 Oct 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1012, via World News Connection). On 6 
October, the government had announced that the occupation caused an 
estimated $20 billion worth of damages, including the costs for loss of property 
by destruction or seizure, and the persecution of individuals and groups. 
(RFE/RL BALTIC STATES REPORT, 16 Oct 00) 
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